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SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXATION
ON AMERICAN PRIVATE LAW*
JOSEPH T. SNEED**

The theme of this 75th Anniversary Conference of the University of
Buffalo School of Law, "The Challenge to Private Law in the United States,"
deserves our intense and unceasing attention. In our time immense pressures,
exerted by and through the authority of the state, have been directed toward
the institutions served by private law and, in turn, upon private law itself. The
result has been change to both. This change, however, has not been described
and analyzed in the manner in which it should be. Although even the most
insensitive observer is aware of the almost constant shifting of the many strata
of law and society under the mounting weight of state authority, very little
systematic charting of this process has taken place. Much charting needs to
be done because only when this task is undertaken will the social costs of our
present tendencies become better known. This conference moves us forward in
this incredibly large and complex task, and it is my hope that this occasion
will lead others to contribute their energy and resources to its advancement.
My contribution is to be a limited one. In the first place it will consist of
examples, arranged in convenient categories, depicting how federal tax law
has influenced, shaped and directed substantive private law. These examples
constitute only a small number of those available, and I am sure that all who
study this paper will think of others, many of which probably would be more
suitable for the purposes of this paper than those I have selected. In addition,
those which are here used range from the important, obvious and dramatic to
the relatively trivial, obscure and drab. Choice of examples occupying various
positions in such a spectrum was made to emphasize the pervasiveness of the
influence of federal tax law. Finally, certain steps which will tend to minimize
the harmful aspects of this influence will be suggested and my not too optimistic estimate of the future will be offered.
A further introductory word is necessary in order for our topic to be put
into proper perspective. The form and structure of federal taxation itself
reflects the order of the society in which it operates. This occurs because
fundamental political, economic and social institutions and habits always exert
a countervailing force which shapes and channels the force of taxation.' The
result of the converging and mingling of these forces is to a substantial degree
mysterious and quite difficult to predict. I have attempted on other occasions
to describe how federal tax law utilizes, as it must, certain deeply rooted insti* The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, delivered at the Statler Hilton Hotel,
Buffalo, New York, November 16, 1962.
** Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.BA. 1941, Southwestern University;
LL.B. 1947, University of Texas; S.J.D. 1958, Harvard.
1. See my contribution to Part Two, Fundamental Concepts of Public Law: A Symposiu,

11 J. Pub. L. 3 (1962).
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tutions and customs and how these provide the skeletal framework of that law.
But federal tax law changes institutions and customs, and these changes, in turn,
alter the tax law. Our present concern, however, is primarily with a species of
the former type of change; but the opposing pressures of society and its institutions upon the tax law must be kept in mind.

I
ASPECTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF TAX LAW UPON PRIVATE LAW

Three aspects of the influence of federal tax law upon private law will
now be considered. While any scheme for classification of phenomena as subtle
and diffuse as that being discussed is obviously incomplete, tentative and
overlapping, the three aspects to be discussed do provide a fairly wide view of
tax influence on private law. These three are: first, the aspect of distortion,
correction or reinforcement of private law rules; second, the aspect of amplification, or enlargement, of certain private law issues because of their high
degree of tax relevance; and third, the aspect of creation of conditions which
generate new and different rules of law and legal relationships as well as cases
and controversies between private parties.
A.

The Aspect of Distortion,Correction or Reinforcement

Only a moment's thought is necessary to realize that the immediate purposes of much of private law and federal taxation are different. As a consequence the influence of tax law on private law in many instances distorts
private law and frustrates its objectives. The permeating character of this
influence, however, means that in some adventitious circumstances tax law
either corrects the erring ways of private law or reinforces the inherent strength
of a good rule. Whether distortion, correction or reinforcement is the result
depends, of course, on one's judgment of the soundness of the particular taxinfluenced private law rule.
The two instances of what I regard as distortion chosen for examination
reveal not only the probable existence of such warping but also the quite often
impossible task of precisely identifying the point in the case flow where the
directional needle of the particular problem was deflected from the true position by the pull of tax considerations. Sometimes, however, this point can be
fairly well established. I believe such to be the case, at least in respect to the
situation which presently exists in the Second Circuit, in my first example, a
relatively unimportant facet of the parol evidence rule.
A few months ago Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit in a
tax case, Commissioner v. Ferrer,3 was faced with opposing contentions in
respect to the applicability of the parol evidence rule to a dispute involving a
2. The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation, II B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 203
(1961).
3. 62-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9518.
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stranger to the contract. The Commissioner contended it was applicable and
that the tax issues should be decided on the basis of the written instruments
alone, while Jose Ferrer, the taxpayer, insisted that the rule was not applicable
in a controversy with a third party and that the issue should be decided on
the basis of the written instruments and certain extrinsic evidence. In deciding
the case the court cited authorities involving tax controversies from several
circuits bearing on the point, but concluded that the issue was not properly
before them because the evidence offered did not vary the written instrument.
The issue is an interesting one, and when one turns to the treatises for
guidance, one finds the most recent edition of Williston declaring the weight
of authority to be that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to third parties
4
except when they seek to enforce rights under the contract. A federal tax case
5
from the Tenth Circuit is cited as authority for this proposition. The case
was one in which the government unsuccessfully sought to increase its tax
collections by confining the taxpayer to the relevant written documents. Corbin,
although characteristically avoiding any conclusion as to the weight of authority, cites many cases pointing in the direction indicated by Williston, some
of which are tax cases, 6 and concludes by disapproving a tax case which restricted the taxpayer to the written instrument. 7 The abundance of tax cases
asserting the majority view suggests that something about the dynamics of
these cases causes the issue to arise frequently and tends to influence the
courts to limit the scope of application of the parol evidence rule.
So one digs more deeply. In examining one of the two Second Circuit
8
decisions in which Judge Friendly cited Stern v. Commissioner, it appears that
the court upheld the Commissioner's right to go behind certain written instruments to fix liability for additional taxes and in so doing asserted: "But the
parol evidence rule only excludes proof varying a written instrument, where the
issues are between the parties to it, and does not affect the right of the Commissioner, who was not a party, to go behind the written contract in order to
discover the true facts."9 (Italics added.) All this has a familiar ring, particularly the last part relating to the power of the Commissioner to discover the
true facts. Does it not resemble the formulation of the Commissioner's preroga10
tives in matters of substance over form and "sham" transactions?
One hastens on. Were there citations for the statement just quoted? What
kind of cases were they? Yes, there were two,:" both tax cases, in one of which,
4. 4 Williston, Contracts § 647 (3d ed. 1961).
5. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1941).
6. Corbin, Contracts § 596, n.9 (1960).
7. The case was Comm'r v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953). See the
discussion of this case infra.
8. 137 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1943).
9. Id. at 46.
10. See Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, The
Supreme Court Review 135, n.73 (1961) for a classification of transactions which have
been designated a "sham" for tax purposes.
11. Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 83 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1936); United States v. Board,
14 F.2d 459 (W.D. Ky. 1926).
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Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was permitted to set aside the
unambiguous form of the transaction and show that the sale of corporate assets
was solely for stock, and in the other, United States v. Board, the taxpayer was
able to introduce extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguous written instruments
for the purpose of showing that a transaction was a sale of corporate stock by
the stockholders and not a sale by the corporation of its assets. It is reasonably
clear that in Tex-Penn Oil Co. the court was not being guided by the niceties
of the parol evidence rule (although perhaps the same result could have been
reached within its limits) but rather was simply according the taxpayer the
advantage of the maxim that substance and not form should govern tax
liability.12 In Board the court appeared to mingle rather indiscriminately the
substance-over-form maxim with language cast in the form of the parol evi13
dence rule.
One point is now clear. The maxim of substance-over-form contributed
substantially to the formulation of the Second Circuit's view of the application
of the parol evidence rule to third persons as expressed in Stern. And when the
citations of Stern by subsequent decisions are examined, another thing becomes
clear. The case has had significant influence. 14 Even so, one may ask, are not
the problems of substance-over-form in tax cases and that of the applicability
of the parol evidence rule to third persons sufficiently similar to justify cross
citation from one to the other? Furthermore, even if not sufficiently similar
to justify cross citation, is not the end result of this tax influence, if such it be,
12. The language used is revealing:
In determining tax liability on contracts, a party is not bound to accept the contract upon its face or the recitations therein, "but may burrow under the words
used in the contract and by extraneous evidence, if necessary, determine the real
agreement between the parties." (Citing the Board case) In form the documents
upon which the Board of Tax Appeals relied stated that the $350,000 was corporate
consideration passing from Transcontinental, but in fact it was not, and the rule
is well settled that in determining tax liability, taxing authorities must look through
form to fact and substance.
83 F.2d 518, 522 (3d Cir. 1936).
13. 14 F.2d 459, 460 (W.D. Ky. 1926).
14. E.g., Brassert v. Clark, 162 F.2d 967, 974 (2d Cir. 1947) (non-tax case); Kind v.
Clark, 161 F.2d 36, 47 (2d Cir. 1947) (non-tax case); Cooper Foundation v. O'Malley,
121 F. Supp. 438, 444 (D. Neb. 1954) (tax case); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Higgins, 120 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (tax case); Boylin, 17 T.C. 542 (1950).
It should be pointed out that the approach of Stern prevails in certain other circuits and
that several reached this result independently of Stern. E.g., Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. 1950) (tax case) ; American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d 477, 479
(10th Cir. 1941) (tax case). These cases have had their influence also. See, Thorsness v.
United States, 260 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1958) (tax case); Landa v. Comm'r, 206 F.2d
431, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The Landa case is interesting because it states the Stern view of
the parol evidence rule and the substance-over-form maxim as independent but equivalent
grounds for admission of the parol testimony. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarusi & Co., 308
U.S. 252, 255 (1939) was cited in support of the substance-over-form maxim, a case in
which a transaction which in form was a sale and lease back was treated for tax purposes
as a mortgage. Mr. justice Black said, "In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws
and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents
are not rigidly binding." (255) See Mustard v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 325, 332 (Ct.
CL. 1957). Haverty Realty & Investment Co., 3 T.C. 161, 167 (1944) (A) employs the
Stern approach, although that case is not cited despite the fact that many other cases, both
tax and non-tax, are marshalled in support.
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to correct or reinforce rather than distort the parol evidence rule? My answer
to the first question is essentially in the negative and to the second, distortion,
not correction or reinforcement, gets my nod.
Let me defend these positions briefly. Both Wigmore'15 and Corbin 16 are
critical of the tax-influenced general rule now prevailing and both recognize
that if the written instrument has become through the proper operation of the
parol evidence rule the exclusive embodiment of the legal relations of the
parties, extrinsic evidence to vary the document should not be admissible even
in litigation involving a third party not claiming under the contract. 17 This
should be no less true in tax litigation when the nature of the legal relations

between parties is the tax relevant issue. Such a view does not deprive the
tax gatherer of his ability to assert substance-over-form because in his hands
at least this weapon in one or more of its variant forms permits the reconstruction of a transaction for tax purposes in a manner which ignores many admittedly present or past legal relationships. Thus, a debt existing under local
law may not be a debt for tax purposes,' 8 the formation and liquidation of a
corporation disregarded,' 9 and other valid and existing legal consequences set
to one side in counting up the tax bill. 20 What has happened, as should now
be plain, is that the parol evidence rule has been deprived of its proper operative scope in controversies between a party to a writing and a third person because in the tax controversies in which the issue has been raised it has been
thought that to afford such scope would impair the effectiveness of the substance-over-form maxim. This is simply wrong; but the error is the father of
my first example of distortion.
A perhaps unfortunate consequence of this distortion has been to encourage taxpayers to believe that their carefully chosen legal forms would be no
more binding on them than upon the Commissioner. 2 ' This is an expectation
not always gratified22 and one which leads us back to the second of the two
15. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2446 (3d ed. 1940).
16. Supra note 6, at § 596.
17. Wigmore, supra note 15, puts it this way: "The truth seems to be, then, that the
rule will still apply to exclude extrinsic utterances, even as against other parties, provided
it is sought to use those utterances for the very purpose for which the writing has superseded them as the legal act."
18. See Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1957).
19. Gregory v. Helvering, 239 U.S. 465 (1935).
20. See Blum, supra note 10.
21. Cf. the following observations of the court in Landa v. Comm'r, 206 F.2d 431,
432 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
Generally "in the field of taxation, adminstrators of the laws, and the courts, are
concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not
rigidly binding." (Citation omitted.) The taxpayer as well as the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue is entitled to the benefit of this rule. Moreover, the oral testimony here was not barred by the parol evidence rule, since the Commissioner ('was
not a party or privy to a party to [the] written agreement[s]."
22. Cf. Television Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 284 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1960) where
the court in rejecting a taxpayer's argument that his transactions should be taxed as they
would have been had they been in a different form said, "It would be quite intolerable to
pyramid the existing complexities of tax law by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting
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cases from his own circuit which Judge Friendly had before him in the
23
matter of Jose Ferrer's taxes. The case was Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate.
In it the court prevented the introduction of a letter written by the grantor of
a trust prior to the execution of the trust indenture, but delivered thereafter,
which purported to explain his motive in establishing the trust. The issue in
the case was whether the grantor had provided for the income of the trust to
be applied toward the discharge of his legal obligation to support his wife. The
court saw the case as one in which the legal obligations existing between the
grantor and his spouse, as affected by the trust instrument, were relevant for
tax purposes and concluded that in determining the nature of these obligations
the parol evidence rule had a part to play. This is entirely proper, and, although
one may doubt the manner in which the court applied the rule,2 4 one must be
grateful that the larger generalities in Stern have been confined.
So we come to this. The parol evidence rule sometimes is, and properly
should be, applicable in controversies with the Commissioner even though he
is not a party to the relevant documents. Of course, if they are not intended
as the integration of certain negotiations, or reveal ambiguities, extrinsic evidence is admissible. The application of the maxim of substance-over-form and
the doctrines of business purpose, step and "sham" transactions remains unimpaired. And, finally, the tax influenced "weight of authority" respecting the
application of the parol evidence rule to third parties should be rejected, and
the more careful formulations of the text writers and Dwight's Estate accepted.
Perhaps you say this sort of confusion would have existed even without tax
law. This is possible. My point is only that tax law contributed.
My second instance is taken from the area of conflict of laws and is one
in which the step-by-step description of the influence of tax law must be less
precise than in my first illustration. It has to do with the proper choice of law
for the purposes of characterizing the income from immovable marital property.2 5 The issue can be presented fairly simply. Income from immovable
separate property located in Texas belonging to a spouse whose marital domicile is in the same state is community property. Does such income possibly
acquire a different characterization when the immovable property from which
it flows is located in a state other than Texas which provides that such income
is separate property? The same problem is presented when a spouse whose
marital domicile is other than Texas invests his separate property in immovable
property located in Texas. Does the Texas characterization of income from
separate property apply in such a case? The prevailing view is that the law of
from the form of the transaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they
might have chosen, whichever is less."
23. 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953).
24. Corbin criticizes the application. Supra note 6, at § 596.
25. For a general survey of the entire area of conflict of laws as it relates to marital
property, see Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws (1952).
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the situs of the immovable controls, and a leading case for this proposition is
26
a tax case, Commissioner v. Skaggs.
My opinion, again not shared by the "weight of authority," is that this
view is unsound and that the law of the marital domicile should control.
Furthermore, the litigation history of the issue suggests that the pressures of
interests normally present only in tax litigation have hampered, if not prevented, the careful scrutiny of policy which the issue deserves. In saying this
it is recognized that the "weight of authority" is supported by other than tax
authorities,2 7 but my point is that either tax law has played a prominent role
in deflecting the course of the law from the proper path,28 or, should my judgment of the rule be wrong, tax law has reinforced a sound result.
In either event, in recent time the law has been influential. Let me briefly
describe the manner in which this influence has manifested itself. In the first
place the court in Skaggs, after pointing out that the laws of community property were statutes real and that immovable property is "exclusively subject to
the law of the country or state in which it is situated,"29 asserted that to permit
Texas law, the law of the marital domicile, to characterize the rental income
from real estate located in California would amount to permitting Texas law
to control the ownership of California land. This equating of ownership of the
income from land with ownership of the land is an idea which is certainly no
stranger to tax law. And, not surprisingly, the court cited in support of its
view two tax cases, Commissioner v. Terry ° and the Supreme Court decision
in Irwin v. Gavit.31 In the latter, it will be remembered, the Court construed a
testamentary gift of income from a portion of trust corpus for a period of years
as equivalent to the gift of an interest in the corpus. By so doing the periodic
receipts of income were placed outside the exclusion for bequests and made
taxable. This result, while quite defensible as a matter of tax law,32 is of little
significance to the issue before the Fifth Circuit in Skaggs. Whether it is proper
to equate the ownership of the income from the land with ownership of the
land depends upon the purpose for which it is done. And the propriety of
doing so for one purpose in no way establishes the propriety for doing so for
another. The Terry case, involving the issue whether under Texas law the
income received under a bequest of "the net interest, income and revenue .. .
during .. .lifetime" was taxable as community income, built on Irwin v.
Gavit8 and reasoned that since such a bequest was the equivalent of "giving
26. 122 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1942).
27. See Hammonds v. Comm'r, 106 F.2d 420, n.7 (10th Cir. 1939), for a partial
list of non-tax authorities.
28. For an effective argument for the law of the marital domicile, see Jackson,
Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 S.W.L.J. 1, 46-52 (1958).
29. Supra note 26, at 723.
30. 69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
31. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
32. Alternative positions, however, are possible. See Bittker, Federal Income Estate and
Gift Taxation 132-33 (2d ed. 1961).
33. The court in Terry also relied on other famous, or infamous as you prefer, instances
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the property itself for life," the bequest was separateproperty but the periodic
income receipts were community. Again there occurs a mingling of strands of
tax law and private law in an indiscriminate manner.
But beyond these nice points lies one, larger, more intangible, and no
doubt more important. It is that Skaggs and other tax cases involving the
point 34 were concerned with taxpayers who sought to obtain the income splitting benefits of the community property system at a time when most Americans had no access to such benefits. Quite obviously the courts would be influenced and tend toward results which confined community property benefits
within narrow geographical and doctrinal limits. This is what happened in
Skaggs, for there the Texan was not permitted to export his system to California,
and income splitting of California rentals was denied. The picture in other
cases35 also demonstrates this tendency. 3 While so engaged in guarding the
revenues and promoting tax equity it is not surprising that private law problems fail to receive from the courts the examination they require. My last
example of the aspect of distortion, correction or reinforcement is one in which
tax influence did not achieve distortion, although that was threatened, but
instead probably reinforces the proper approach to the private law area. The
example relates to the rights obtained by the assignee of a chose in action.
For centuries both scholars and courts have been concerned with the extent of
such rights and their proper characterization as between "legal" on the one
hand, and "equitable" on the other. In 1958 the Supreme Court in United
States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co. 37 gave the tax liens of the federal government priority over the claims of a surety to whom a subcontractor in a
housing project, the delinquent taxpayer, previously had made an assignment
as collateral security of all sums due or to become due under the subcontract. In
doing so the court cryptically observed the assignee's rights were "inchoate."
The decision left many questions. Granting that the test of "choateness" is a
federal question 38 was not the court, influenced by its desire to facilitate
revenue collections, viewing the rights of an assignee in an antiquated manner?
in tax law in which the income from property was equated with the property from which

it flows. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 580 (1895).
34. E.g., Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Noble v. Comm'r, 138
F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1943); Hammonds v. Comm'r, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939); Benjamin
H. McElhinney, Jr., 17 T.C. 7 (1951).
35. Ibid.

36. In Noble, although the oil and gas law was located in Texas, the income therefrom

was treated as the separate income of the taxpayer, a resident of Oklahoma. Perhaps this
case is in conflict with Skaggs, but it is probably more appropriate to classify it as

distinguishable on its facts. In Hammonds, however, Oklahoma residents were permitted
to split the income from a Texas oil and gas lease located in Texas which was acquired

in exchange for personal services rendered in Texas and elsewhere. In Trapp the reasoning
of Noble and Hammonds was combined to substantially limit the extent to which an
Oklahoma owner of Texas oil and gas leases could split the income therefrom. In
McElhinney all the above cases, even when joined by Skaggs, managed to convert only a
small portion of the income of a Texas partnership into community income to a Virginia
partner.
37. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
38. Cf. United States v. L. R. Foy Construction Co., 300 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1962).
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Corbin thought so and evidenced fear that such a view would produce mischief
even in transactions in which the tax collector had no interest.3 9 To him the
Court's view was the ghost of a theory about the rights of assignees which he,
Walter Wheeler Cook and others had destroyed decades before. And the assignees agreed. They fought back, and in Crest Finance Co. 40 "choateness" was
established where the assignments, as well as the loans which they secured,
occurred prior to perfection of federal tax liens against the property of the
assignor. Thus, under the pressure of taxation, a significant step has been
taken to exorcise this ghost of yester-century which, with the elegant impartiality we like to see in taxation, was brought forth by these same pressures.
B.

The Amplification Aspect

Tax law not only sometimes distorts, corrects, or reinforces private law
but also enlarges the importance of certain areas of private law. Indeed a not
uncommon preliminary situation to legislative surgery of the type which will be
mentioned in a moment is the amplification of a particular private law point. In
many instances prior to the time the issue assumed its tax importance it had
been considered either sufficiently well settled to be considered hornbook law
or at least precise enough to serve the everyday needs of the jurisdiction. Once,
however, significant tax consequences come to turn on these thought to be
settled areas of the law, all the heretofore obscured defects in workmanship
come to our attention and what was thought a finished legal composition
appears as only a crude and unorchestrated score.
Such is what has happened recently in the law relating to allowances
available to surviving members of the family of the deceased during the period
of administration of his estate. The matter acquired its tax importance because
of the marital deduction. Awards to the surviving spouse often will reduce
federal estate taxes providing such awards qualify for the marital deduction.
Whether they do turns on a number of issues; but for present purposes it is
enough to say that the determinative issue usually is whether the allowance
constitutes a "terminable interest." If so, the allowance does not qualify for
the marital deduction. Again speaking generally, an interest is a disqualified,
"terminable" one when it will terminate or fail upon the happening of some
event and, as a result, one other than the surviving spouse may possess and
enjoy it 4 1
It should now be clear that whether an allowance set aside for a surviving spouse qualifies for the marital deduction involves a fairly close scrutiny
of local probate law to determine the contingencies, if any, which would
39. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 903 (1950, Supp. 1961).
40. Crest Finance Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1962). Both this opinion and
the majority opinion in R. F. Ball, supra note 37 are models of undesirable brevityonly a few lines in both instances. See United States v. Crest Finance Co., 305 F.2d 332
(7th Cir. 1962) for the circuit court opinion after the remand by the Supreme Court.
41. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 2056(b) (1) contains the precise statement of the
"terminable interest rule."
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extinguish the right to such an allowance. For the past half dozen or more
years such scrutiny has been taking place in the courts charged with tax
matters. 42 One of the key areas of local law examined by these courts is the
effect under such law of the death or remarriage of surviving spouse upon his
right to the allowance. You will recall that because the family allowance is
related to the right of support in many jurisdictions these contingencies do
extinguish or diminish the right of the surviving spouse. 43 The tax law, however,
is not merely interested in this general pattern but is concerned with the
precise manner in which these contingencies operate. For example, the Fifth
Circuit and the Tax Court appear to regard the tax relevant issue as being the
effect on the surviving spouse's right to the allowance of death or remarriage
44
subsequent to the time the decree establishing the allowance becomes final.
4
Unfortunately this is a point not often explicitly dealt with in local law 5
42. For a good collection of the cases, See Casner, Estate Planning 12-17 (3d ed.
1961).
43. E.g., California, In re Estate of Blair, 42 Cal.2d 728, 269 P.2d 612 (1954);
Georgia, May v. Braddock, 92 Ga. App. 302, 88 S.E.2d 539 (1955) (interpretation of
law prior to several recent amendments); Maine, Tarbox v. Fisher, 50 Me. 236 (1863);
Massachusetts, Adams v. Adams, 51 Mass. 170 (1845); Nebraska, Re Estate of Oscar
Samson, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N.W.2d 60 (1942), 144 A.L.R. 264; Oregon, Varner v. Portland
Trust Bank, 210 Ore. 658 (1957); 313 P.2d 444.
44. United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta, 297 F.2d 312
(5th Cir. 1961); Estate of Michael G. Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1962); Estate of Margaret
R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1962). In First National Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta the court said
"that the question of the terminability of the interest or award is to be decided upon the
law of the state where the interest arose, using the rule of examination of the interest at
the time that interest arose, treating that time as being at the time of the court award."
(316) The court examined Georgia law and concluded that even though death of the
surviving spouse within twelve months following the death of the decedent and prior to
the filing of an application for the award would terminate the right of the widow to an
allowance, Georgia law dearly indicated that the allowance "once claimed" and "reduced
to certainty by the order of the court in the form of an award" was "vested indefeasibly."
(317) In Rudnick the Tax Court declared that the terminability of the widow's allowance
must be examined as of the time the interest arose and that time was "the time the
Probate Court entered its order granting the allowance." (1003) In Gale a similar position
was taken. Maine law was examined to determine whether the allowance was indefeasibly
vested at the time of the entry of a final decree authorizing the allowance. Although the
point is arguable, the Ninth Circuit appears to approach the matter differently and to focus
upon whether the characteristics of the allowance existing at the date of death make it a
terminable interest. See Cunha's Estate v. Comm'r, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960);
United States National Bank of Portland v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore.
1960). The Service has acquiesced in Gale, supra, and Rudnick, supra.
45. See Estate of Margaret R. Gale, supra note 44, where Tax Court said: "No
Maine court has decided the exact point at issue here, but a strong inference may be
drawn from such cases as exist where widows' allowances have been attached on other
grounds." (220) Also in Estate of Blair, supra note 43, a California case relied on heavily by
Cunha's Estate, supra note 44, the widow died prior to the filing of any petition to secure
a family allowance and not subsequent to the decree becoming final. However, in Estate of
Hamilton, 66 Cal. 576, 6 Pac. 493 (1885) the California court held that upon remarriage
by a widow: "The order of allowance to her, theretofore made, terminated at her second
marriage, without the further order of the court." (576-77). This ruling apparently has
reference to payments which under the terms of the order were not accrued prior to
remarriage. As to such sums as are due and owing prior to death or remarriage under
an order granting a family allowance, In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73, 45 P. 1023 (1896) holds
that these contingencies will not terminate the widow's rights. It is not certain where
this puts California if the relevant issue for tax purposes is as described by the Fifth
Circuit and the Tax Court.
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despite the fact that the "system" of family allowances has been working
reasonably well for, in some cases, a century or more. Thus, a gap in local law
is revealed, and an area long removed from intense professional concern
emerges from its obscurity. This, in short, is the amplification aspect of tax
law on local law.
This example, furthermore, depicts but a small segment of a larger area
of private law which also nicely illustrates the amplification aspect. This
larger area is that of the existence and scope of the obligation to support. The
tax relevance of this area has been delineated by others, 46 sometimes quite
elaborately, 47 and need not be described again in detail. It is enough to point
out (1) that under sections 662, 677 and 678 of the 1954 Code the presence
and nature of the obligation to support is relevant to the issue whether the
income of a trust is attributable to the obligor of such duty; (2) that the
retention by a grantor of a right, or perhaps even a possibility, to have the
income of property applied in discharge of his obligation of support is relevant
in determining the grantor's gross estate; and (3) that whether a lifetime
transfer discharges or diminishes the transferor's obligation to support the
transferee may determine gift tax consequences. These, and many related
issues, have forced an examination of local law to learn, inter alia, the identity
of the obligees, whether the obligor's responsibility is affected by the financial
condition of the obligee, 48 the extent to which the obligation is secured by
effective enforcement in other than divorce and separation, 49 and, of course, the
type of expenditures made mandatory by the obligation. 50 However, local law,
particularly with respect to the latter two of these issues, is not abundantly
clear.r 1 Although the divorce and separation cases provide a benchmark,5 2 the
46. EKg., Savage, Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Support Trusts and
Uniform Gifts to Minors Statute Gifts; What Support for Tax Purposes,N.Y.U. 17th Inst.
on Fed. Tax 1097 (1959); Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal Taxation: A Modest
Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 53 (1956).
47. E.g., Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1191 (1961).
48. Cf.Treas.Reg.§ 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
49. See Note, supra note 47 at n.27.
50. E.g., College education expenses, the second-hand or new car, the summer vacation
trip to Europe and so on through the items which, when available, make the years before
21 very full indeed. Are these mandatory? If not, can their payment be in discharge of an
obligation of support?
51. There is little or no local law of a definitive nature on the subject of the nature
or extent of the family support obligation while the family is united. Pedrick, supra note
46, at 63 and n37.
The most frequently litigated aspect of the expenditures a court may require is support
for a college education. But even on this point, the cases are divided. E.g., in Maitzen v.
Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1960), it is held that college education
for children of average or better scholarship is a necessity of the day requiring the
increase of the support of an adult child. This view is gaining the ascendancy. E.g., Rawley
v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 593, 210 P.2d 891 (1949), Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d
748 (1948).
But see, contra, Boens v. Bennett, 20 Cal.App.2d 477, 67 P.2d 715 (1937): "The father
is under no legal duty, after his son has attained the age of 16 years to send the latter
to college, no matter what the father's financial circumstances may be." (718).
52. E.g., Maitzen, supra note 51; Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960);
Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959). There is
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obscurities of law in other situations simply reflect the absence of a strong social
need for precise guides in such areas. It remained for tax law to make important
its omissions and uncertainties. These now painfully clear defects naturally
suggest that local law be altered; and thus we come to the creative aspects of
tax law's influence on local law.
C. The Creative Aspect
The examples of this type of influence are so numerous it is difficult to
know where to begin. Perhaps a return to the family allowance situation will
provide both continuity and the first example of this aspect. The amplification
resulting from the examination of the rights of the surviving spouse to an
allowance during the course of administration to determine their qualification
for the marital deduction has already induced at least one state, Connecticut, to
alter its law so that death during administration does not extinguish the right
of such spouse to an allowance. 53 A similar response is occurring with respect
to the local law consequences of disclaimers by those who take by intestate
succession. Tax law, using the approach of Htardenbergh v. Commissioner,"4
treats a disclaimer as a taxable gift where, under the applicable local law, title
to the interest disclaimed vested in the person disclaiming prior to such disclaimer and the effect of such disclaimer is to pass the title from such person
to another. Frequently such are the local law consequences of a disclaimer by
one who takes by intestate succession, but it is often otherwise with respect
to legatees and devisees under a will.6 5 This distinction, while perhaps useful
under some circumstances involving the rights of private parties,50 is not of
sufficient substance to justify the difference in tax consequences between a
disclaiming heir and legatee. 57 As a consequence there is an unmistakable trend
in the states toward amendment of their statutes to provide similar consequences for disclaimers by heirs, legatees and devisees.58
In both these situations tax law is the generating source of the change
but nothing in the formulation of the relevant tax law suggests that such a
change was an explicit object of such law. Indeed, in the disclaimer situation
it is probably of little concern to the Treasury what approach the local law
takes, 9 and little, if any apprehension apparently exists in respect to family
allowances. 60
some evidence that the divorce and separation cases have been used as analogies controlling the united-family situations. 74 Harv. Law Rev. 1191, 1205 (1961).
53. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 45-250 (1958, Supp. 1961).
54. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
55. See Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
56. E.g., the consequences of intestacy proved useful to aid in determining the title
to land in Lathrop v. Kellogg, 322 P.2d 572 (D.C. Cal. 1958).
57. In accord, see Lauritzen, "Only God Can Make an Heir," 48 Nw. U. L. Rev.
568 (1953); 31 Texas L. Rev.599 (1953).

58. See Smith-Hurd Illinois Ann. Stat. ch. 30, §§ 211-213 (1962); Page's Ohio Rev,
Code § 2105.061, effective October 6, 1961. For additional citations to recent legislative
changes in this area, see Casner, Estate Planning 35, note 67 (3d ed. 1961).
59. Cf.Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c), (1958).
60. The recent acquiescences in Gale and Rudnick, supra note 44, suggest that a change
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Not always, of course, does the Treasury observe with apparent equanimity
a change of local law which it did not foresee or explicitly seek to induce. Many
examples of changes which elicited Treasury concern readily come to mind,
and certainly, one of the most notable is the threatened adoption of community
property systems by many states just prior to the Revenue Act of 1948. A
current situation which could have produced an unintended change of local
law by numerous jurisdictions and caused concern to the Treasury involved a
local institution-The Buffalo Savings Bank. The New York Court of Appeals
in Buffalo Savings Bank v. Victory6 ' interpreted New York law in a way which
freed mortgages of the burden of local taxes accruing subsequent to the perfecting of a federal tax lien, but prior to foreclosure of the mortgage debt, and
imposed such burden on the United States. The Supreme Court reversed. 62 Had
this not occurred many states would have made certain that their law embodied
63
provisions similar to those of New York.
Naturally the spectacle of state legislatures and courts quickly altering
their laws to provide tax advantages to their citizens is offensive to some; but
before such activity be vigorously condemned, it must be remembered that the
national government has employed this propensity of the states to achieve
national purposes. The federal estate tax credit for death taxes imposed by the
states was enacted, for example, to induce the states either to enact such taxes
or to refrain from abolishing those which they had in response to interstate
competition for the wealthy. 64 More recently the enactment of the Internal
Revenue Code provisions establishing the real estate investment trust 65 and the
promulgation of comprehensive regulations relating to associations taxable as
corporations66 has encouraged fairly extensive legislation 67 on the part of the
of local law to vest family allowances at the time the decree becomes final will in no way
impair the interests of the Treasury.
61. 11 N.Y.2d 31, 181 N.E.2d 413, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1962).
62. United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 63-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9166. The court stated
that the priority rules of federal tax liens could not be avoided "by the formalistic device
of characterizing subsequently accruing local liens as expenses of sale."
63. This would have involved not only the adoption of the substance of section 1087
of the Civil Practice Act but also the view of the Court of Appeals that local real estate
taxes and water rent liens constitute an indebtedness of the property itself incurred "for
essential services supplied for the benefit of the land" and not "an unconnected indebtedness of the owner of the land." 11 N.Y.2d 31, 38-39, 181 N.E.2d 413, 416, 226 N.Y.S.2d
382, 387 (1962).
64. See Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause, 13 N.C.L.
Rev. 270 (1935).
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 856-58.
66. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960).
67. In the real estate investment trust area see, N.Y. Real Property Law § 96(7);
N.Y. Personal Property Law § 11(c); Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. Art. 6138A (Supp. 1962).
Approximately one-third of the states have adopted some form of "professional association"
statute which is a direct response to the regulations, supra note 65 and other tax pressures.
For a penetrating study of some of these statutes on the basis that the regulations are
valid, see Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments, 17 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1961). Perhaps the recent enactment of the Self-Employed
Individual Tax Retirement Act of 1962, P.L. 87-792 will stay the hand of some of the
remaining states. Should this happen it too would demonstrate the power of tax law to
induce a legislative response, inaction in this instance.
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states which, to some extent at least, was foreseeable. It is true, of course, that
in these instances national policy is not as prominent as in the tax credit for
state death duties; but in all three tax law or administrative rulings initiated
a not wholly unpredictable legislative response by the states.
There is another body of cases which also illustrate the creative aspect
and which in many ways are the most fascinating of all. The operation of
tax law, sometimes harsh and fortuitous in its consequences, produces good
faith controversies between private parties. These controversies are not the
non-adversary "collusive" proceedings in state courts which are designed for
the explicit purpose of influencing tax results, 6 but are genuine disputes generated by the impact of a particular federal tax.
The first, Miles v. Livingstone, 9 a quite recent First Circuit decision, is
difficult to read without being reminded of the long standing judicial attitude
which has often led a court to deny a recovery in restitution when sought by
a party to an illegal transaction.70 The case developed from the efforts of the
plaintiff and defendant to arrange a device, involving the plaintiff's purchase
with borrowed funds and subsequent sale of government securities, which
would yield the plaintiff a substantial tax reduction through the interaction
of an interest deduction and capital gains. The device was a failure. 71 The
plaintiff, deprived of his interest deduction, sought to recover the prepaid
interest from the defendant on the grounds, inter alia, of deceit. The First Circuit, wavering between asserting that the device appeared to have possibilities
when proposed and that no reasonable person could have believed that it would
succeed, held for the defendant. The burden imposed by an unaccommodating
2
tax law was not shifted.7
My second example involves a cluster of cases in which tax burden shifting,
or at least rearrangement, has often been accomplished. The problem of these
cases arises in quite complicated forms, but its essence is the extent to which
the impact of federal income and estate taxes is to be permitted to alter the
relative positions of various beneficiaries of trusts and estates inter se. A sketch
of Estate of Bixby 73 will be illustrative. A substantial part of the taxable income of an estate consisted of dividend income which under California law
68. See Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax
Proceedings, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638 (1953). For a case where "collusive" was interpreted
broadly see Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.
1957).
69. 301 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1962).
70. In Bartle v. Nutt, 4 Pet. 184, 189 (U.S. 1830) the Supreme Court said: "If either
(party to an illegal contract] has sustained a loss by the bad faith of a particeps crmninis,
it is but a just infliction for premeditated and deeply practiced fraud; which, when detected,
deprives him of anticipated profits, or subjects him to unexpected losses."
71. The cases are numerous. See Eli . Goodstein, 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd 267
F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959) and the other cases cited in Miles v. Livingstone, supra note 68, n.2.

72. A representation as to tax consequences can be the basis of liability under the
doctrine of Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In such instances the

tax disappointment will be visited upon others. Cf. Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299
F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962).
73. 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956).
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belonged to the legatee of a specific legacy of the stock in respect to which the
dividends were declared. Administration expenses were deducted against this
income rather than against the gross estate for estate tax purposes. The effect
was to increase the estate tax burden to certain beneficiaries under the will,
reduce the income tax paid by the estate, and augment the entire estate by
the amount the income tax savings exceeded the increase in estate taxes. The
court permitted the prejudiced beneficiaries to recoup a portion of their loss
from the legatee of. the stock who was benefited substantially by the deduction
of administration expenses from estate income. 74 A similar case In re Warms'
EstateY7 5 exists in New York, and the general problem is a substantial one in
6
the administration of trusts.
Now let us step back a pace or two. Our picture of the influence of federal tax law, while but little more than a fragmentary outline, permits us to
glimpse, at lease in the mind's eye, a bit of both the grand sweep and intricate
detail which a completed canvas might reveal. As we imagine how the future
strokes of the brush will be placed, surely we must wonder whether its coloration will be somber or bright. Let me describe for you my view.
II
SOME SUGGESTIONS AND A HARD LOOK AT THE FUTURE

The previous discussion plainly suggests that, although the problem of
the influence of the law upon private law is both enormous and pervasive, there
are a few procedures which could do a bit to minimize the undesirable features
of this influence. In the first place tax cases enunciating private law principles
should be used as authorities in litigation between private parties only after
a careful examination of the tax relevance of the principle to determine the
possibility of distortion by tax pressures. Every lawyer and judge should
become aware of this possibility; and if a reformulation of the principle is
necessary to protect the non-fiscal interests intended to be served by the principle, the fiscal concerns of neither the sovereign nor the subject should bar
such a restatement. In short, private law in the main should serve non-fiscal
ends, and in our society only vigilance of an unusual sort will make this so.
74. In this particular case the legatee retained a significant portion of the tax
benefit because the income tax savings greatly exceeded the amount necessary to compensate the beneficiaries prejudiced by the loss of an estate tax deduction.
75. 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955); see N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 316 (1962).
76. E.g., In re Estate of Dick, 29 Misc. 2d 648, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1961)
(trustee not permitted to adjust accounts between an income beneficiary and remaindermen
under a trust even though charges against trust principal when taken as deductions against
distributable net income benefited the income beneficiary and not the remaindermen). For
a discussion of the problem see 2 Page, Wills 44 (Bowe and Parker ed. 1960). For other
examples of tax spawned litigation, see Allen v. Spencer, 214 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(unsuccessful suit to compel change of retirement orders so as to make pension tax free);
Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194, 29 N.W.2d 271 (1947) (transfers to partnership to minimize
taxes set aside on grounds of mistake where scheme failed); In re Floyd's Estate, 43
AFTR 1301 (Orphan's Ct. Del. County, Pa. 1951) (executrix ordered to sign a joint return
to provide benefits of income splitting).
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It follows from this that, where tax law has bent the private law into a
shape that best serves the non-fiscal interests involved, the tax cases accomplishing this feat be used only as secondary support for a result already suggested by reason and private law authorities. Legal scholars when describing
an area of private law should employ such tax cases circumspectly and avoid
the practice of citing them as primary authorities.
It is not enough, however, to use tax decisions circumspectly in tracing
out the details of a private law area. In addition, law men, to use Llewellyn's
term, 77 should avoid the temptation of fashioning a rule or principle in the
context of a private dispute which, despite its deficiencies in such context,
admirably solves some real or imagined tax issue. To do this is improper for
one or more of three reasons: the non-fiscal interests are poorly served, the
tax issue may be non-existent and, even if present, the tax law probably will
be changed in no less than a decade. The same adjuration is applicable to the
law men who serve in, or appear before, or attempt to influence legislatures.
Naturally a solution to a private law issue which admirably serves both the
fiscal and non-fiscal interests involved should not be condemned even if the
solution favors the taxpayer. It is pure cant, to borrow a mode of expression
from Judge Learned Hand,78 to urge that local law of the states should maximize the tax collections of the federal treasury at the expense of all other
competing interests.
Restraint and wisdom, however, are burdens of law men at the federal
level as well as at that of the states. All feasible efforts should be made to
avoid pivoting significant tax distinctions on insignificant features of local
law. 79 For example, to return to the disclaimer situation, tax law should never
have established a distinction between legatees and devisees on the one hand
and heirs on the other. To have done so is but slightly more defensible than
permitting the "title" to property to materially influence the attribution of
income therefrom to the proper taxpayer. All agree that the latter is unthinkable. Nonetheless, a small random sampling of tax cases demonstrates to me a
readiness on the part of the Commissioner to employ in litigation with taxpayers nicely refined features of local law, whose substantive consequences
in the context of the relevant tax issues were of little significance, where such
77. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 23, n.14 (1960).

78. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1947) involved the taxability
of income to the husband and trustee of two trusts established to provide for two minor
children by their mother. The majority of the Court held that the grant of power to the
trustee to revoke or alter the trust was too broad, and that the purpose of the
trusts was actually to avoid taxation. Judge Hand attacked the latter argument at the
conclusion of his dissent: "Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does
so, rich or poor; and all do right for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than
the law demands! Taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand
more in the name of morals is mere cant." (850-51).
79. The Treasury Regulations, supra note 65, relating to associations taxable as
corporations are guilty of this.
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features possibly would be of assistance to him.80 This practice to some extent
encourages courts to forego a hard-headed analysis of the social, economic, and
legal consequences of the tax relevant situation before them and leads taxpayers to smile wryly when the Commissioner righteously asserts the inapplicability of formal distinctions rooted in local law. While the prescription is
a difficult one to follow, the taxing authorities should seek always to turn tax
issues on features of local law which are (1) not easily manipulated without
injury to significant private interests, (2) reasonably unambiguous and well
established and (3) consistent with the goals of equality and uniformity.8 '
Furthermore, it appears to me to be unwise for the federal government to seek
frequently the alteration of state law by rewarding such change with tax
advantages. Enough has been said to indicate that this is a game at which two
can, and do, play. To alleviate its consequences restraint by both the federal
government and the states is required.
This paper could be brought to a felicitous end were it possible for me at
this point to predict that the handful of obvious measures just described would
be made effective. This I cannot do, however. The reasons? They do not
originate in any plot to unravel the fabric of federalism, but rather they spring
from our commitment to greatness. As this nation in the nineteenth century
instinctively recognized in "Manifest Destiny" the summation of its temporal
aspirations, so today "Leadership of the Western World" draws us onward.
The challenge of our twentieth century mission leads us to shoulder the steadily
increasing burden of taxation imposed by our governments with a reasonably
moderate amount of criticism. We do not like to pay taxes, it is true; but we
prefer the greatness of leadership to relief from taxes.
These things being true, there neither exists presently nor in the foreseeable future any significant prospect of abatement of revenue demands, and in
the absence of such abatement the processes of "fiscalizing" our private law
80. The sample is 21 Tax Court of the United States Reports. References to local
law appeared in many of the cases. In three instances the Commissioner relied on features
of local law which do not embody substantial legal or economic consequences. In Stern,
21 T.C. 155 (1953) the Commissioner relied on the common law characterization of a
tenancy by the entirety which made each spouse seized per tout et non per my to contend
that a sale by taxpayer to his son-in-law and daughter as tenants by the entirety was a
sale "between members of a family" within the meaning of section 24(b) of the 1939 Code.
His contention was upheld by the Tax Court, but rejected by the Third Circuit. 215 F.2d
701, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1954). In Doran, 21 T.C. 374 (1953) a South Carolina statute making
all payments to state employees salary and not perquisites was relied on partially to make
a rental allowance paid the taxpayer by the state compensation and not quarters furnished
for the convenience of the employer. However, in Saunders, 21 T.C. 630 (1953) a New
Jersey characterization of a payment as a ration allowance and not compensation was
asserted to be insufficient to remove the allowance from gross income. The Commissioner
won in both instances; but Saunders was reversed, 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954). The third
instance was found in Andigier, 21 T.C. 665 (1954) where the Commissioner to buttress
an already strong case relied upon the Tennessee rule that a written contract signed by the
party to be bound is prima fade evidence of consideration to rebut the taxpayer's claim
of gift. He was successful, and there was no reversal.
81. See Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determinations, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1350 (1959) where these criteria are examined in some detail.
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which I have described will probably continue. Move, counter-move, and then
counter-counter-move are the now familiar steps of this process. Some things
can be done to avoid its excesses, but in the end I doubt the developments I
have been describing will be halted. But then we will have greatness-perhaps.

